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Weighting Parties and Coalitions: How Coalition
Signals Inﬂuence Voting Behavior
Thomas Gschwend, University of Mannheim
Michael F. Meffert, Leiden University
Lukas F. Stoetzer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Democratic accountability is characterized as weak in parliamentary systems where voters cannot choose their govern-
ment directly. We argue that coalition signals about desirable and undesirable coalitions that might be formed after the
election help to provide this essential aspect of democratic government. We propose a simple model that identiﬁes the
effect of coalition signals on individual vote decisions. Based on survey experiments in two different countries we show
how coalition signals change the relative weight of voters’ party and coalition considerations. Coalition signals increase the
importance of coalition considerations and, at the same time, decrease the importance of party considerations in voters’
decision calculus, leading some voters to change their vote intention.
A central feature of democratic representation is thatthe government actively works to foster congruencebetween the preferences of the electorate and the
government even if the preferences of the electorate change.
The mechanisms to secure that and to hold the government
accountable are popular elections. As long as there are single-
party governments, this is in fact a straightforward process.
However, in most democratic parliaments we do not ﬁnd a
single party that has a legislative majority of seats. Rather,
coalition governments have to be formed after the election
(Hobolt and Karp 2010; Kedar 2011; Meffert and Gschwend
2010). Does this necessarily imply that democratic account-
ability is seriously hampered? In contrast to the textbook view
on democratic institutions we argue that coalition signals—
a not well-understood feature of political campaigns—can
foster accountability at least as a by-product even in situations
where voters cannot choose their government directly.
During election campaigns parties often announce which
coalition they might or might not form after the election
depending on the outcome on election day. Such “coalition
signals” are prominently covered by the media, which is then
eager to further speculate about the composition of the next
government. In practice, coalition signals can offer crucial
information to voters (Gschwend, Stoetzer, and Zittlau 2016).
As one preelectoral coalition strategy (Golder 2005, 2006), co-
alition signals may provide guidance about which coalition
governments are conceivable politically and likely to gain a
majority in parliament. They reduce the number of theoreti-
cally possible coalitions to a manageable range and help citi-
zens to form clearer expectations about the government for-
mation process after the election. A coalition of parties, for
instance, that signaled their intention to govern together be-
fore the election can reasonably claim to have won a mandate
after the election if they managed to get a majority of seats in
parliament.
Arguably, preelectoral coalitions have important implica-
tions for the nature of representative governments. If voters
have clearer expectations about government formation after
the election, they are better able to assess the potential (policy)
consequences of voting particular coalitions into ofﬁce. This
way coalition signals facilitate clarity of responsibility, ac-
countability, and identiﬁability of future governments even in
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systems that do not per se employ majoritarian institutions.
This useful function for promoting these essential aspects of
democratic government has long been noted in the literature
(Clark, Golder, and Golder 2012; Powell 2000; Strom 1990).
Given their prominence in everyday politics as well as
their theoretical and practical importance for “good” voting
decisions in complex multiparty environments, evidence
about how coalition signals work at the individual level is
mostly and surprisingly lacking. In this article we present a
simple model that allows to directly estimate the effect of co-
alition signals on individual voting decisions. By using unique
survey experiments in two different countries, we ﬁnd that
coalition signals have an effect on voters’ decision calculus by
changing the relative weights in voters’ utility function. Co-
alition signals increase the importance of coalition consid-
erations and, at the same time, decrease the importance of
party considerations. By developing a novel methodological
approach to estimate decision weights of different but com-
peting considerations, we give coalition signals and their po-
tential effects on vote decisions the attention they deserve.
Placing more weight on coalition preferences relative to
party preferences when deciding which party to select matters
for accountability because coalitions (and not merely a party)
can be held accountable for government policy. If coalitions
are identiﬁable, the process to anticipate who will be part of
the new government is more transparent and predictable
(Debus 2009; Martin and Stevenson 2001, 2010). Thus, voters
are enabled to register their support in such a way that an
incumbent coalition government perceived as incompetent is
voted out of ofﬁce and replaced by a new coalition government
that promises to better represent their policy preferences.
WHY COALITION SIGNALS MATTER:
THE EXISTING EVIDENCE
Coalition governments are very common in parliamentary
democracies, creating an electoral environment and incen-
tives that differ considerably from the familiar two-party com-
petition in textbook examples. For parties, one preelectoral
strategy is to send out coalition signals during campaigns.
Such signals can be deﬁned as any ofﬁcial or unofﬁcial pre-
electoral statement by a party, party members, or other po-
litical actors about coalitions that might or might not be
formed after the next election.
Empirically, preelectoral coalitions and preelectoral coor-
dination are fairly common among parties during campaigns
(Golder 2005, 2006). Very common are joint campaign events
or press conference in which the respective party leaders ap-
pear side by side. For example, during the 1998 German elec-
tion, the leaders of the Social Democrats (Gerhard Schröder,
SPD) and the Green Party (Joschka Fischer, Greens) who
eventually succeeded the Helmut Kohl-led Christian-liberal
(CDU-FDP) government, campaigned together. In many Scan-
dinavian countries party leaders of the alternative coalition to
the incumbent government organize common press confer-
ences (Fredén 2014). Sometimes, such as in Norway (2005),
the coalition parties even develop common platforms before
the election (Allern and Aylott 2009) or coordinate their can-
didate entries such as in Portugal (Gschwend 2007a) or France
(Blais and Indridason 2008). Viewers of the ﬁctional Danish
TV series “Borgen”—a (functional) equivalent of “House of
Cards”—will be familiar with vivid illustrations of such co-
ordination.
For a voter, multiparty systems might appear to make it
extremely difﬁcult to anticipate the future government and
then to vote for a coalition party that will move the new
government’s policy output as closely as possible to the voter’s
position. It requires that this party is not only represented in
parliament (e.g., by passing some minimum vote threshold)
but also becomes a member of the next coalition. However,
this might be easier than it ﬁrst appears. As “members of
the polity” (Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1989), citizens tend to
be familiar with the political history and the political parties
of a country (Armstrong and Duch 2010; Gschwend 2007b;
Herrmann 2014). Parties are real and existing organizations
and thus well-known to voters. Coalitions, on the other hand,
are mostly hypothetical constructs with the notable exception
of the current incumbent coalition and any other recent co-
alition government. In short, voters possess a basic political
coordinate system that helps them to rule out implausible
coalitions among the many theoretically possible ones. Nev-
ertheless, in order to predict viable coalition alternatives prior
to an election, citizens need more current and pertinent in-
formation.
Besides preelection polls, coalition signals are the most
obvious source of such information. Parties might use such
signals to announce a preferred coalition partner or rule out
other parties as unacceptable in a future coalition govern-
ment. If voters take such signals into account, they might ad-
just and change their vote intentions based on the expected
outcome of the election. And history shows, those signals are
not just cheap talk for voters. They have real consequences.
Parties get punished if they do not keep them. In the 1996New
Zealand election, for instance, “New Zealand First” clearly
signaled that it would not form a coalition government with
“National” but then did not keep this promise (Bowler, Karp,
and Donovan 2010). As a consequence, the party lost about
two-thirds of its support in the next election.
How do voters take coalition signals into account? Take,
for example, an instrumental voter who prefers a party that
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is unlikely to join the next government. If other parties sig-
nal that they like to form the next government, this voter
could defect from her preferred party and rather cast a vote
for the most preferred party among the expected coalition
parties in order to inﬂuence the composition and portfolio
of the next government. There is evidence from recent Israeli
and Austrian election that, in particular, small party sup-
porters systematically apply this type of coalition voting strat-
egy (Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Herrmann 2014; Meffert and
Gschwend 2010).
Coalition signals could also prime voters to support an-
other party in order to prevent a likely coalition. If a voter
dislikes the signaled coalition partner of her most preferred
party, she might defect from her preferred party and instead
cast her vote for a party that makes this coalition less likely.
Evidence from recent Austrian, German, and Belgian elec-
tions is consistent with this type of voting behavior in multi-
party systems (Gschwend and Hooghe 2008; Herrmann
2014; Linhart 2009; Meffert et al. 2011). In short, the recent
literature indicates that coalition considerations matter above
and beyond party considerations for electoral behavior in mul-
tiparty systems (e.g., Aldrich et al. 2004; Bargsted and Kedar
2009; Blais et al. 2006; Duch, May, and Armstrong 2010;
Kedar 2011; Meffert and Gschwend 2010). What is less clear,
however, is how to identify and estimate the effects of these
different considerations. In a given electoral contest, the key
causal factors—coalition signals and party preferences—do
not vary much, making causal inferences very difﬁcult.
One solution is to conduct counterfactual simulations.
Linhart (2009), for example, starts with a formal model of a
voter’s decision-making process in a multiparty system where
voters anticipate the coalition bargaining process and the
resulting position of the new government using coalition sig-
nals. Combiningmeasures of observed coalition signals before
the 2005 German Federal election with various counterfac-
tual simulations, he demonstrates that coalition consider-
ations (should) have a strong impact on instrumental voters.
Incidentally, he also identiﬁes conditions under which coali-
tion signals are an efﬁcient tool in a party’s electoral strategy.
More direct evidence comes from laboratory experiments
that allow the creation of theoretically relevant decision sce-
narios by manipulating coalition signals and testing their ef-
fect on voters. Coalition signals have been used as a treatment
in an economic experiment to test a decision-theoretic model
of vote choice in a multiparty system (Meffert and Gschwend
2012). Participants with an instrumental (ﬁnancial) motiva-
tion were asked to vote in various elections in which the avail-
ability of polls and coalition signals was manipulated to test
under what conditions strategic voting happens. The results
show that participants rely on simple decision heuristics in
order to behave strategically and are highly susceptible to co-
alition signals.1
A weakness of such laboratory experiments is external
validity, making randomized experiments embedded in rep-
resentative surveys an ideal compromise to address the effect
of coalition signals. Irwin and Van Holsteyn (2012), for ex-
ample, operationalized coalition signals as a part of vignettes
in a survey experiment in the Netherlands (see also Irwin and
Van Holsteyn 2008). These vignettes presented respondents
with hypothetical but plausible results of opinion polls and
their consequences for the formation of the next coalition
government. The results suggest that some voters even used
these vignettes to actually develop an initial vote intention,
while those with a vote intention, in particular supporters of
small parties, sometimes changed their vote intention. If the
preferred small party was a member of the next coalition (ac-
cording to the vignette), voters were more likely to support
the preferred party. But if the small party was not in the co-
alition, supporters of small parties were more likely to defect
(compared to supporters of large parties). This suggests that
small party supporters are more likely to engage in strategic
coalition voting behavior. Nevertheless, vignettes that com-
bine poll results with coalition signals cannot isolate the effect
of coalition signals from the effects of poll results, leaving the
question of distinct coalition signal effects open.
In summary, the limited existing evidence suggests that
coalition signals can be quite inﬂuential and are used by voters
to adjust their vote intentions. In the next sections, we propose
a simple mechanism that can explain such effects—coalition
signals prime coalition considerations at the expense of party
considerations—as well as a statistical model for survey ex-
periments that can estimate the shiftingweights of the different
considerations. Based on this model, it is possible to identify
which coalition signals lead to changes in vote decisions.
HOW COALITION SIGNALS MATTER:
A THEORETICAL DECISION MODEL
The previous section suggests that coalition signals matter.
However, the current literature is rather agnostic about the pro-
cesses by which they should exert an inﬂuence on an individ-
ual’s decision to vote. In this section we propose a model that
reﬂects the systematic component of such a decision-making
process. We then derive a particular observable implication of
this model that can be tested with a survey experiment.
1. In a psychological experiment embedded in two actual state elec-
tion campaigns in Germany, Meffert and Gschwend (2011) tested the
effects of coalition signals on voting behavior for real parties. The results
again suggest that coalition signals did increase the likelihood of defection
from the preferred party.
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Our model starts with the premise that voters are able to
form considerations about parties as well as coalitions. The
established theory of political behavior building on insights
derived from case-studies about the United States suggests,
of course, that party considerations should play a dominant
role in the way people make up their mind. Parties are “real,”
after all. Thus, one constituent part in a voter’s utility function
should depend on a party-centered component, how much
she prefers different parties. In order to focus our discussion,
we leave aside questions to what degree those party prefer-
ences are rooted in valence assessments, ideological judgments,
or something else.
Given the state of the literature about voting behavior in
multiparty settings, though, it is by now fairly uncontroversial
to assume that voters also use a second, coalition-centered
component in their vote-choice function.2 Again, the focus
is not on the origin of such coalition preferences. In essence,
we assume merely that coalition considerations could be one
relevant additional yardstick for voters. Given that typically
no single party wins an outright majority of seats in parlia-
ment, voters aremotivated to support the coalition they prefer
most or to increase the likelihood that a coalition govern-
ment perceived as incompetent is voted out of ofﬁce. This way
voters can hold coalition governments accountable.
Finally, we assume that voters can consider both com-
ponents, party as well as coalition considerations, together in
their decision-making process. Given that voters have al-
ready formed preexisting political attitudes about parties and
(some) coalitions, it is likely that those attitudes affect the
voting decision one way or another. This perspective reﬂects
the current consensus in the literature on coalition voting
(e.g., Aldrich et al. 2004; Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Blais et al.
2006; Duch et al. 2010; Gschwend et al. 2016; Kedar 2011;
Meffert and Gschwend 2010). As long as party and coalition
preferences are together on the right-hand side of any vote-
choice model, this implies that a voter—no matter how the
respective systematic component of the model does parame-
terize her decision-making process—will employ both com-
ponents simultaneously.
How do coalition signals come in? Our central argument is
that coalition signals can prime coalition considerations. They
greatly reduce the number of theoretically possible coalitions
and help citizens to form clearer expectations about the
government formation process after the election. Most im-
portantly, they remind voters of the electoral relevance of
preexisting political attitudes about coalitions and make these
considerations more accessible to them when forming and
expressing a vote intention. Once those coalition consider-
ations are made more accessible, voters should take them
(more) into account. In other words, a coalition signal about a
concrete coalition should increase the importance voters at-
tach to coalition considerations regarding this coalition rela-
tive to party considerations in their decision making process.
Similar to Bartels (2006, 82), we use the term “priming” to
refer to any systematic change in the relative weights attached
to coalition and party considerations, that is, the preexisting
political attitudes toward coalitions and parties that determine
the vote intention, for example expressed in the context of a
survey experiment.
To formalize those ideas, we deﬁne that the systematic
part of the utility that voter i derives from party j is a mixture
of the party-centered component Pij and a coalition-centered
component Ci. Our parameter of interest, g, is the mixing
component between the two:
Vij p gPij 1 (12 g)Ci : ð1Þ
Equation (1) depicts each voter’s utility as a weighted aver-
age of coalition and party considerations, with the relative
weights depending on the importance of coalition consider-
ations for her utility. Note that if g is equal to 1, the model
reduces to the traditional party-centered component. If g is
equal to 0, our model reduces to the coalition-centered com-
ponent in which parties would no longer be the dominant
judgmental objects for political decision making.
Of theoretical interest here is the mixing parameter g: To
what extend do voters employ coalition considerations rel-
ative to party considerations in their vote decision? If our
priming story is correct, we expect coalition signals to sys-
tematically increase the relative importance of coalition versus
party considerations in an individual’s decision-making pro-
cess. Given our utility model from above, the observable im-
plication would be that coalition signals should decrease the
size of the mixing parameter g. If no coalition signal is pres-
ent party consideration as opposed to coalition consideration
should dominate the decision-making process. A high esti-
mated value for the respective mixing parameter g would
support this logic. The situation should systematically change
if the voter is primed with a coalition signal. If a coalition sig-
nal is present, coalition considerations regarding this coalition
should become more important and, consequently, the size
of the mixing parameter g should decrease.3
2. In addition to more short-term considerations about parties and co-
alitions there are, of course, other long-term factors such as party identiﬁcation
and other socio-demographic characteristics that anchor voters’ decision-
making process.
3. Alternatively, the decision-making process could be conceptualized
in such a way that an individual voter uses either party or coalition
considerations but not both simultaneously. Such an alternative utility
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The next section outlines our empirical strategy to test
whether the mixing parameter g changes systematically when
comparing a standard vote choice situation with one in which
the voter is primed by a coalition signal. This test draws on
two survey experiments, one included in an Austrian preelec-
tion study in 2006 and the other in the 2009 German Longi-
tudinal Election Study (GLES).
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: COALITION VIGNETTES
How can we know whether coalition signals increase voters’
reliance on coalition considerations? Our empirical strategy
is to embed coalition signals as vignettes in a representative
population survey (for a similar strategy, see Irwin and Van
Holsteyn [2008, 2012]). In fact, we leverage data from two
different survey experiments in Austria and Germany to test
our expectations. The presentation of a particular coalition
vignette that stresses a speciﬁc coalition scenario mimics a
particular real-world coalition signal and is expected to prime
coalition considerations. In order to identify the effect of such
a coalition signal, our general strategy across both data sets is
to compare respondents’ answer to the standard vote inten-
tion question, called the “standard decision” below, with re-
sponses to a second vote intention question that is asked
immediately after the presentation of each coalition vignette.
We call the second decision in both experiments the “vignette
decision.” The variance in terms of coalition considerations
between the standard decision where no coalition signal is
presented and each vignette decision that should prime par-
ticular coalition considerations allows us to identify the causal
effect of each coalition signal. If a respondent’s intention to
vote changes between the two decisions, this can be directly
attributed to the perception of a particular coalition vignette
that presents a hypothetical coalition scenario. The imple-
mentation of the vignettes as coalition signals differs across
the two studies in important aspects. Thus, we will discuss
them separately.
The ﬁrst survey experiment was implemented in a pre-
election survey of the Austrian General Election 2006. Partic-
ipants were exposed to four different vignettes. The coalition
scenarios in those vignettes used coalitions that voters would
accept as plausible; the two major parties, the Austrian Peo-
ple’s Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democrats (SPÖ), were each
combined with one of the smaller parties, the Greens and the
Freedom Party (FPÖ). The vignettes were presented shortly
after asking the standard vote intention question. They were
introduced by the statement that “most parties have not made
a clear announcement about possible coalitions after the elec-
tion” and followed by four vignettes, in randomized order:
“For which party would you vote if the Greens would
clearly reject a coalition with the SPÖ and announce
the intention to form a coalition with the ÖVP?”
“For which party would you vote if theGreenswould
clearly reject a coalition with the ÖVP and announce
the intention to form a coalition with the SPÖ?”
“For which party would you vote if the FPÖ would
drop its intention to not participate in any coalition
and rather announce the intention to form a coalition
with the ÖVP?”
“For which party would you vote if the FPÖ would
drop its intention to not participate in any coalition
and rather announce the intention to form a coalition
with the SPÖ?”
A different set of vignette decisions is implemented in the
German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES Online Tracking
T4). In this study participants were exposed to four coalition
scenarios: a coalition between the Christian Democrats (CDU/
CSU) and the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen); a coalition
between the Social Democrats (SPD), the Liberals (FDP), and
theGreen party, which is commonly referred to as the “trafﬁc-
light coalition”; a “Left Alliance” coalition between the SPD,
Greens, and the Left party (Die Linke), and, ﬁnally, a social-
liberal coalition between the SPD and the FDP. The wording
of the question introduced these four possibilities with “Before
elections, parties make statements about potential parties they
want to form a coalition with. In the following we present four
examples of such statements.” This is followed by four vi-
gnettes starting with: “For which party would you vote if . . .”
“the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) announce
the intention to join a coalition led by CDU/CSU?”
“SPD and Greens announce the intention to form
a coalition with the FDP?”
“SPD and Greens announce the intention to form
a coalition with the Left Party (Die Linke)?”
could be written as Vij p giPij 1 (12 gi)Ci , where gi is now speciﬁc for
individual voters and assumed to be drawn from a Bernoulli distribution,
gi ∼ Ber(p), with a hyper-parameter p. The latter can be interpreted as the
share of party-type voters in the electorate. In this alternative model coalition
signals do not affect each individual’s weight that reﬂects the importance of
coalition considerations relative to party considerations but simply let more
voters employ coalition considerations instead of party considerations. The
impact of coalition signals is thus on the hyper-parameter p rather than on
the weight between party and coalition considerations. However, the esti-
mated coefﬁcients of the systematic component of such an alternative pro-
cess would, on average, correspond to the mixing parameter g between party
and coalition preferences in our model. As a consequence, we cannot em-
pirically distinguish both processes. Further research could devise an ex-
perimental design that allows one to tease out the differences between both
processes.
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“the FDP announces the intention to join a SPD-
led coalition?”
To sum up, both the GLES and the Austrian study include
four different coalition vignettes that allow us to estimate the
effect of coalition signals on vote intentions. Apart from stan-
dard party-centered measurements, such as party like/dislike
scores, both studies further include equivalent measures to
rate coalitions on the very same 11-point scale. We use those
measures to operationalize the party-speciﬁc (Pij) as well as
the coalition-speciﬁc (Ci) components of equation (1) di-
rectly.4 In the next section we lay out how we are going to
model a voter’s decision-making process across both deci-
sions, the standard and the vignette decision. In order to be
as close as possible to our theoretical model, we will intro-
duce a novel choice model that is tailored to directly estimate
the parameter of interest (g).
STATISTICAL MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE EFFECT
OF COALITION VIGNETTES
This section outlines a new statistical model that permits us
to estimate the effect of coalition signals on respondents’ re-
liance on coalition relative to party considerations. Given our
empirical strategy we are interested in comparing the stan-
dard decision with the vignette decision to determine whether
priming a voter’s coalition considerations leads respondents
to rely more on coalition considerations and less on party con-
siderations. Consequently, we need to model the transition
probabilities between the two decisions. If coalition signals
cause voters to rely more on coalition considerations relative
to party considerations, the mixing parameter g2 of the vi-
gnette decision should systematically decrease as compared
to g1, the mixing parameter of the standard decision. In the
following discussion we focus on coalition signals with co-
alitions of two parties.5
We conceptualize voters’ relevant choice situation as either
intending to vote for one of the two parties (yt p 1, yt p 2)
mentioned in the respective coalition vignette, or intending
to do something else (yt p 3).
6 Thus, each decision com-
prisesa choice setof threedifferentchoices j∈f1, 2, 3g.Given
that we model two sequential decisions simultaneously, j1
represents the vote choice in the standard decision asked
ﬁrst, while j2 represents the vote choice of the vignette deci-
sion that is asked second. Across both decisions we distin-
guish nine different outcomes Yj1j2 .
7 Such a sequential choice
situation constitutes a ﬁrst-order Markov chain process (Dig-
gle et al. 2002; Hillygus 2007). We simultaneously estimate
nine so-called transition probabilities, denoted by pj1j2 with
opj1j2 p 1, to represent voters’ probability to change their
vote choice across both decisions.8 Table 1 schematically
depicts all nine transition probabilities.
In order to specify a model for those nine transition prob-
abilities, we start by mapping out this sequential choice pro-
cess, as visualized in a decision tree in ﬁgure 1. In the standard
decision a respondent intends to vote for one of the parties
mentioned in the coalition vignette or any third alternative.
The same is true for the vignette decision. Respondent i de-
rives utility U1ij from each of the choices in the standard de-
cision. The utility resulting from the vignette decision can
be thought of being dependent upon the standard decision.
Hence, two voters who intend to vote for the same party in
the vignette decision will nevertheless receive different utili-
ties from that decision if one of them intended to vote for
party A previously, while the other intended to vote for party
B. We take this into account by conceptualizing the utility of
the second vignette decision as dependent on the outcome
of the ﬁrst standard decision (U2ijjy1).
Now we can derive a statistical model that is tailored to
the sequential choice processes we are interested in.9 Fol-
lowing random-utility theory we assume that someone who
votes for the ﬁrst party twice (Y11) receives a higher utility
from this party than from voting for the coalition partner
mentioned in the vignette or from choosing something else.
This can be formalized in the following way:
yp Yj1 j2⇔
(
U1j1 1 U
1
k1 for all k1 ≠ j1; k1, j1∈ J
U2j2 jy1 1 U2k2 jy1 for all k2 ≠ j2; k2, j2∈ J
: ð2Þ
As usual, we assume that these utilities are random
variables and therefore can be partitioned into a systematic
4. Table 1 and table 9 in the appendix show the descriptive statistics of
those variables.
5. The German data include two vignettes that prime three-party
coalitions. In order to use those vignettes, we also extend themodel outlined
here to be applied to a situation with three parties.
6. The third category includes decisions such as “intending to vote” for
any other party on the ballot or “not voting” at all. We combine these deci-
sions as we aremostly interested in observing any reaction that pushes or pulls
voters toward or away from the two parties included in the vignette. Taking
all possible transitions into account is not feasible and cannot be estimated
(e.g., with ﬁve parties, abstention, and a don’t know/undecided category, these
seven choice options already produce 49 possible transitions).
7. For example, if a respondent intends to vote for party A in the
standard as well as the vignette decision, the outcome would be Y11. If she
intended to vote for party A in the standard and party B in the vignette
decision, the outcome would be denoted as Y12, and if she intended to vote
for party A in the standard decision and did something else in the vignette
decision, the outcome would be Y13.
8. The idea to derive such a sequential choice model is strongly in-
ﬂuenced by Signorino (2003). Our adaptation, however, is tailored to analyze
sequential choice decision in survey experiments.
9. To simplify notation we drop the reference to voter i.
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component (Vtjt ), which we will parameterize to provide a
test of our theory about how coalitions signals work, and a
stochastic component (ϵtjt ). To keep the estimation problem
tractable we assume independent, identically distributed
(iid) errors following a type I extreme value distribution and
parameterize the systematic component accordingly to ac-
count for the sources of the interdependence between both
decisions.10 Given those assumptions, the transition proba-
bility of intending to vote j1 in the standard decision and j2
in the vignette decision can be derived as follows:
pj1j2 p Pr½e1j1 2 e1k1 1 V1j1 2 V1k1 
#Pr½e2j2 2 e2k2 1 V2j2 2 V2k2  :
ð3Þ
Thus, the transition probability pj1j2 is equal to the
probability to vote j1 in the standard decision multiplied by
the probability to vote j2 in the vignette decision, which can
be estimated by the following product of two multinomial
logit models that are jointly estimated:
pj1j2 p
eV
1
ij1
eV
1
i1 1 eV
1
i2 1 eV
1
i3
#
eV
2
ij2
eV
2
i1 1 eV
2
i2 1 eV
2
i3
: ð4Þ
For identiﬁcation purposes we set the utilities V1ij3 and
V2ij3 equal to zero. Thus, the utility for the two parties are
deﬁned relatively to not intending to vote for any of the two
parties mentioned in the coalition vignette.
After deriving a statistical model to analyze a given choice
situation, the next step is to tailor the systematic component
directly to our theory. It consist of three parts. First, we need
to parameterize the effect of party and coalition consider-
ations to construct a valid theory test. Second, we account for
the source of interdependence of the sequential choices by
adding a dummy y1j to the systematic component of the vi-
gnette decision indicating whether a respondent has already
reported the same vote intention in the standard decision
(i.e., y1j p 1 if and only if y1 p j).
11 Third, there might
be other factors that explain a respondent’s vote intention.
We therefore add party-speciﬁc covariates and sociodemo-
graphic controls to the utility speciﬁcation. Together, those
three parts give us the following speciﬁcation of the system-
atic component:
V1ij1 p b1j 1 l1½g1Pij 1 (12 g1)Ci1 Zijd1 1 Xiwj1,
V2ij2 p b2j 1 l2½g2Pij 1 (12 g2)Ci1 Zijd2 1 Xiwj2 1 ay1j:
ð5Þ
We specify different parameters for the utility in the
standard and vignette decision,12 including b1j and b2j as
choice-speciﬁc constants ( j∈ J). Coalition considerations Ci
and party considerations Pij are operationalized by like/
dislike rating scores that depict a voter’s overall assessment
of the parties and the coalition in the vignette. While l1 and
l2 show the effect of party and coalition considerations in
the standard and the vignette decision, g1 and g2 estimate
the theoretically interesting mixing parameters. Allowing the
mixing parameter to vary between the standard and the vi-
gnette decision permits us to directly test our theoretical ex-
pectation. If a coalition signal primes voters to rely more on
coalition considerations, we should ﬁnd a lower mixing pa-
rameter in the vignette than in the standard decision; that is,
we expect g1 2 g2 1 0. The interdependence of the vote
intention in the vignette decision from the vote intention in
the standard decision is captured by a.13
Table 1. Conceptualization of a Sequential Choice
Process with Nine Transition Probabilities
y2 p 1 y2 p 2 y2 p 3
y1 p 1 p11 p12 p23
y1 p 2 p21 p22 p23
y1 p 3 p31 p32 p33
10. It is well-known that iid violations can be simply produced by
misspeciﬁed systematic components (Signorino 2003). A preferable strategy in
many applied settings is therefore to account for potential sources of iid
violations in the speciﬁcation of the systematic component rather than the
stochastic component of the model (Dow and Endersby 2004; Glasgow 2001).
This is what we do. Nevertheless, we also tried to relax the assumption of iid
errors through parameterizing the variance-covariance matrix (which turns
out to be a 9# 9 matrix) and assuming multivariate normal distributed
errors accordingly. Unfortunately, there is simply not enough information to
reliably estimate at least some unconstrained parameters in the variance-
covariance matrix. This is a well-known limitation in practical applications
of such models.
11. For a similar strategy to represent previous states in a Markov
transition as categorical variables, see Epstein et al. (2006). The cautious
reader will realize that our assumption of iid errors is potentially violated.
Again, as pointed out in note 10, it is a preferable strategy in applied
settings to account for potential sources of iid violations directly (Dow and
Endersby 2004; Glasgow 2001; Horowitz 1991) through the speciﬁcation
of the systematic component—in our case by including y1j—rather than
the stochastic component of the model.
12. We opt for this ﬂexible speciﬁcation as we do not want to assume
a priori that all effect parameters are the same in standard and vignette
decisions. Given that we control for the vignette decision, whether the
respondent has reported the same vote intention in the standard decision,
the parameters might differ across the choice scenarios.
13. Note that the inclusion of such a dummy provides a rather con-
servative test of our theory because an increased reliance on coalition
considerations might not necessarily lead to a change in behavior. The
true effect of coalition signals could be greater than reported below.
648 / Coalition Signals and Voting Behavior Thomas Gschwend, Michael F. Meffert, and Lukas F. Stoetzer
This content downloaded from 130.060.130.056 on December 12, 2017 03:23:28 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
We further employ a set of controls that follows com-
mon practice in specifying vote choice models (see, e.g.,
Duch et al. 2010). The matrixes Zij contain choice-speciﬁc
covariates, controlling for the effect of an individual’s party
identiﬁcation and the effect of the squared ideological dis-
tance to a party. The vectors d1 and d2 are the conditional
effect parameters for these two controls for the standard and
vignette decision. The matrix Xi contains sociodemographic
variables of the respondent (age, gender, education, religion,
union membership, and income).14 yj1 and yj2 are their ef-
fect parameters. To simplify notation, we collapse all param-
eters into a vector V.
We estimate pr(VjPij,Ci,Zij,Xi, y1j), the joint probability
distribution of the parameters given the data, using Bayesian
inference. Therefore, we iteratively sample from the poste-
rior distribution, which is a product of the likelihood15 and
the prior distribution p(V). In order to restrict the param-
eter space of the mixing parameters to the unit interval,
we choose a uniform prior distribution on this interval, that
is, p(g1) ∼ U(0, 1) and p(g2) ∼ U(0, 1), respectively. For all
other parameters in the model we specify uninformative
normal priors with mean zero and variance of 1,000. Results
are initially obtained byMCMC sampling running two chains
for 20,000 iterations, discarding the ﬁrst 18,000 iterations
as burn-in. The model is implemented using JAGS (ver-
sion 3.1.0).16
Results from the Austrian preelection study
In this section we present the results from our survey-
vignette experiment in context of the Austrian 2006 pre-
election study. First, we test whether respondents rely more
on coalition considerations and less on party consideration
for their vote choice when primed with coalition signal. Sec-
ond, we assess the consequences of an increased importance
of coalition considerations in an individual’s decision-making
calculus.
We provide four independent tests of our priming argu-
ment with the Austrian data. For each of the four vignettes
we estimate one model using party and coalition consider-
ations operationalized as respondents’ like/dislike rating scores
for parties and coalitions.17 Our quantities of interests to test
our priming argument are the estimated mixing parameters.
They indicate the relative weight voters attach to party and
coalition considerations when forming their decision.18 We
present the estimated mixing parameters together with their
Bayesian credible intervals across all four vignettes for the
respective standard decision (black) as well as the vignette
decision (gray) in the left panel of ﬁgure 2.
Overall, the results indicate strong support for our the-
ory that coalition considerations become more important
in a voter’s decision calculus when primed with a coalition
signal. Across all four tests we ﬁnd the same expected pat-
Figure 1. A sequential choice model
14. We refer the reader to the appendix for the way we operationalize
those concepts.
15. The likelihood for our choice model is given by:
Lp ∏
N
ip1
∏
3
j1p1
∏
3
j2p1
p
z j1 j2
j1 j2
,
where z j1 j2 p 1 if yp Yj1 j2 and 0 otherwise.
16. We checked model convergence using Heidelberger and Welch
(1981) half-width test as well as the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (Gelman
and Rubin 1992). If all b and d passed the half-width test and if the upper
bound of Gelman and Rubin’s diagnostic was below 1.5, we considered the
model to have converged. We also conducted Geweke (1992) diagnostic
tests. The appendix includes the test results as well as density and trace
plots.
17. Unfortunately, there are no rating scores for a SPÖ-FPÖ coalition
that is required to estimate the mixing parameters in our model. Thus, we
have to slightly adjust the utility speciﬁcation for this coalition vignette.
Instead of a coalition rating, we employ the ratings of the respective co-
alition partner. In the appendix we show that while the respective mixing
parameter will be measured on a different scale, we can still test whether it
decreases in the vignette decision compared to the standard decision.
18. A complete overview over all estimated model parameters with
Bayesian credible intervals can be found in table 7 in the appendix.
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tern. The estimated mixing parameter is lower in the stan-
dard decision than in the vignette decision. Does this imply
that the mixing parameter systematically decreases as ex-
pected when predicting the vote choice of the same respon-
dent across both decisions? In order to answer this question
and to provide a hard test for our theory, we need to show
that the ﬁrst difference between the two mixing parameters
is positive, that is, g^1 2 g^2 1 0.
Our Bayesian model setup allows us to directly sample the
ﬁrst differences between themixing parameter in the standard
decision and the mixing parameter for the vignette decision
from the posterior distribution. This tells us to what degree
an average respondent weighs coalition considerations more
heavily in the vignette decision as compared to the standard
decision.
The right panel of ﬁgure 2 plots the ﬁrst differences of
the mixing parameters for all four coalition signals. It shows
that the respective 95% Bayesian credible intervals are to
the right of 0 for each coalition signal. The simulations of
the ﬁrst differences imply that respondents systematically
rely more on coalition considerations and at the same time
less on party considerations when primed with a coalition
signal. The lesson that can be learned so far is that coalition
signals change the relative weights of party and coalition con-
siderations in a voter’s utility function. We ﬁnd that coalition
considerations for the coalition in each signal become more
important relative to party considerations.
What are potential consequences of an increased impor-
tance of coalition considerations in an individual’s decision-
making calculus? If coalition signals are able to change the
importance voters attach to the same yardsticks that deter-
mine their vote choice, then we should observe potential
changes in their voting behavior when primedwith a coalition
signal. This does not necessarily imply that all voters change
their vote intention. If someone is already very likely to vote
for a certain party, then coalition signals might still increase
the importance of coalition considerations but not lead to a
different vote decision.
One way to asses this observable implication of our theory
is to systematically compare how likely our model predicts
respondents to vote for a particular party with and without
being primed by a particular coalition signal. Given that we
now know what coalitions signals do, we should ﬁnd that an
increased reliance on particular coalition considerationsmight
lead voters to reconsider their standing vote decision. This
should be the case for supporters of a coalition party who do
not like this coalition. When primed by a coalition signal in
the vignette decision the predicted probabilities to vote for
one of those parties should decrease the more this coalition is
disliked. We do not expect such a relationship between coa-
lition preferences and vote intention when coalition consider-
ations are not primed, that is, in the standard decision.
Figure 3 shows exactly this. We plot the predicted prob-
abilities of voting for the Greens based on our model for the
Figure 2. Estimated mixing parameter in the Austrian preelection study. The left panel shows the estimated mixing parameter of the standard and the vignette
decision. As expected, g^1 is always to the right of the respective estimated mixing parameter g^2 of the vignette decision. The right panel shows the ﬁrst
differences g^1 2 g^2 of the mixing parameters. Values to the right of 0 indicate that coalition considerations are weighted more heavily after being primed.
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standard decision (dashed line) and compare those to the
ones of the vignette decision (solid line) that primed a coali-
tion of SPÖ and Greens. The predicted probabilities are
sampled from the posterior distribution for an otherwise
typical respondent that rates the Green party with the highest
possible score and the SPÖ with an average score. We further
assume that our respondent does not identify with any of
the two parties, and intends to vote for the Greens in the
standard decision. The ﬁgure shows how predicted proba-
bilities in both decisions vary with different coalition ratings.
For the vignette decision, predicted probabilities increase
from 0.63 ([0.47, 0.75]) for the lowest coalition rating to 0.92
([0.87, 0.95]) for the highest rating score, while the effect of
coalition ratings is negligible without priming this coalition
in the standard decision. Predicted probabilities only increase
from 0.98 to 0.99 with overlapping credible intervals ([0.93,
0.99] and [0.98, 0.99]). Thus, Green voters are more likely to
change their vote intention if they dislike the primed coalition
in the coalition signal.19
To sum up, these results illustrate that coalition signals
prime coalition considerations. Coalition signals increase the
importance of coalition considerations in relation to party
considerations when voters make up their mind who to vote
for on election day. Furthermore, the increased importance
of coalition considerations through priming can have im-
portant behavioral consequences. The proclivity to vote for
one of those parties in the coalition signal decreases the more
this coalition is disliked. This might cause voters to change
their voting behavior. Do these ﬁndings about the impact of
coalition signals depend on the particular party system or
electoral context for which we drafted those vignettes? This
is fortunately not the case as we show in the next section.
Results from the German Longitudinal
Election Study
In order to show that our results travel across time and
countries, we present the results of four more comparable
survey vignettes representing particular coalition signals that
were implemented in the 2009 GLES (German Longitudi-
nal Election Study). While two vignettes prime coalitions
between two parties similar to the Austrian case, the two
remaining vignettes prime relevant three-party coalitions.20
As before, we estimate our model for each of the four vi-
gnettes in the GLES separately.
For all four models we estimate the mixing parameters
to be lower in the vignette decision than in the standard
decision.21 But how likely is it that the mixing parameter of
the vignette decision is lower than the mixing parameter of
the standard decision? In order to answer this question we
inspect—as before in the Austrian case—the respective ﬁrst
differences of the mixing parameters. We provide the mean
together with their 95% credible interval for each of the ﬁrst
differences in left panel of ﬁgure 4.
The results for the coalition signals representing both two-
party coalitions provide strong support for our theory. The
ﬁgure clearly shows that the credible intervals do not cross
the reference line at zero. In fact, although implemented in
a different country at a different time within idiosyncratically
different election campaigns, and using slightly different de-
signs and wordings, the estimated size of the ﬁrst differences
between themixing parameters of eachmodel are comparable
for all two-party coalitions in Austria and Germany.
The results for the coalition signals representing the three-
party coalitions look similar although the estimated size of
the respective ﬁrst differences is generally smaller. Moreover,
their credible intervals intersect with the reference line. From
our posterior draws, however, we can calculate the likelihood
that the differences of the estimated mixing parameters ﬁt
our expectation. Looking at the posterior draws of the re-
spective ﬁrst differences, we ﬁnd that with a probability of
95.5% respondents weigh their coalition preferences higher
when primed with an appropriate coalition signal compared
Figure 3. Probability to vote for Greens in standard vs. SPÖ-Green vignette
decision by different levels of ratings for SPÖ-Green coalition.
19. We observe a similar pattern for other coalition signals, see the
appendix, ﬁgure 1.
20. In order to make use of vignettes of three-party coalitions, we
straightforwardly extend our model to 4# 4 choices to account for a larger
choice set. Each respondent could report an intention to vote for one of the
three parties in such a coalition or, as before, do something else. For a more
detailed description of the model we refer to the appendix of the article.
21. We present mean and 95% Bayesian credible intervals of the pa-
rameters’ posterior distributions of each model in table 15 in the appendix.
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to the standard decision. This makes us fairly conﬁdent that
there is a systematic difference between the two decisions as
expected. Even when primed with an SPD-Greens-Left coa-
lition signal we are at least 89.7% certain that respondents rely
more on their respective coalition preferences rather than
their party preferences.22 At the same time, one has to ac-
knowledge the increased complexity of the estimation prob-
lem. Although the extension of our research strategy to in-
clude three-party coalitions is conceptually and theoretically
straightforward, this extension comes at a high cost. The
number of outcomes increases from 9 in the two-party coa-
lition case to 16 in a three-coalition case. Some of these out-
comes are rarely observed, which makes it harder to reliably
estimate the theoretically interesting mixing parameters of
our model.
Overall, the results from Germany are converging with
the results from Austria. Together they provide consistent
evidence for our priming argument and do not seem to de-
pend on either a particular election context or on a speciﬁc
party system.23 Coalition signals prime voters to rely more
on coalition preferences when forming their decision. Coa-
lition signals increase the importance of coalition consider-
ations and, at the same time, decrease the importance of party
considerations when voters make up their mind. This can lead
voters to reconsider their standing vote choice decision and
change their voting behavior.
Finally, there is also converging evidence across our
Austrian and German results that coalition signals not only
do not confuse voters but rather seem to facilitate better
decisions by priming relevant considerations. When com-
paring descriptively the transition matrices between stan-
dard and vignette decision we ﬁnd that no matter which of
the vignettes is administered, there are more German and
Austrian nonvoters who are mobilized and report a vote
intention after being exposed to vignettes than voters who
are demobilized.24 Thus, there is a positive net-effect indi-
cating that coalition signals consistently have the potential
to increase turnout and reduce voter confusion.
CONCLUSION
Coalition signals are an important preelectoral strategy for
parties during election campaigns in multiparty democra-
Figure 4. Estimated mixing parameter in the German Longitudinal Election Study. The left panel shows the estimated mixing parameter of the standard and
the vignette decision. As expected, g^1 is always to the right of the respective estimated mixing parameter g^2 of the vignette decision. The right panel shows the
ﬁrst differences g^1 2 g^2 of the mixing parameters. Values to the right of 0 indicate that coalition considerations are weighted more heavily after being primed.
22. The respective probabilities for the two-party coalition signals indi-
cate that almost the entire support of the distribution is on the unit interval.
23. We further checked the robustness of our results against unob-
served confounders. Section G, in the appendix of this article, reports that
the results hold across ﬁve randomly constructed three-quarter subsets of
the respective data sets.
24. We refer the interested reader to tables 2 and 14 in appendixes A
and C, respectively. For further supporting evidence, see also Bytzek et al.
(2011, 402).
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cies. Such coalition signals seem to remind voters about the
outcome of the election and the coalition bargaining process.
In our survey experiments, they increase our respondents’
reliance on coalition considerations at the expense of party
considerations when formulating their vote choice deci-
sion. Coalition signals can even lead voters to systematically
reconsider their standing vote choice decision. Given the
converging evidence based on data from survey vignettes
representing coalition signals in two countries, Austria and
Germany, our results do not seem to depend on a particular
election context, party system, or a speciﬁc operationaliza-
tion and wording of the vignettes.
At ﬁrst sight, coalition signals seem to distract voters from
determining which party they prefer most. If this were true,
it would reﬂect poorly on popular conceptions of democratic
representation. However, our results rather suggest the op-
posite. Coalition signals not only do not confuse voters but
rather facilitate better decisions by priming relevant consid-
erations. They remind voters that a coalition of parties and
not a single party alone will form the government after the
election. They also help voters to ﬁgure out which party they
should support to vote their most preferred coalition into
ofﬁce. This also nicely complements previous accounts from
Belgium (Gschwend and Hooghe 2008) and Poland (Ka-
minski 2001, 302), indicating that voters do not blindly fol-
low those signals. Thus, coalition signals can offer valuable
information to hold the government accountable and to iden-
tify potential future governments, particularly in an environ-
ment that is typically characterized as providing voters only
with low levels of accountability.
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that our analysis
only identiﬁes the effect of coalition signals if they yield a
change in party choice when comparing the vote intentions
before and after exposure to coalition vignettes. The true effect
of coalition signals could be greater than reported here if, for
example, reinforcement effects are taken into account. A small
party supporter might become even more inclined to vote for
her party after hearing that the party is willing to join a coa-
lition with a larger party—assuming that this voter strongly
approves such a coalition.
While we provide evidence in support of priming as a
mechanismhow coalition signals work, coalition signals could
instead change voters’ expectations about which coalitions
are likely to emerge in the postelection bargaining period.
Thus, rather than priming speciﬁc coalition considerations,
coalition signals could primarily reduce the number of theo-
retically possible coalitions. According to such an alterna-
tive expectation-formation account they help citizens to form
clearer expectations about the government formation process
after the election. A positive coalition signal would indicate
that, conditional on getting a majority of seats in the legisla-
ture, the parties in the signal will actually form the govern-
ment. But how to distinguish the expectation-formation ac-
count from a pure priming story we propagate here? There
is no priming effect without changing voters’ expectations
about which coalitions are likely to expect after the election—
and vice versa. Every change in voters’ expectations about
parties’ willingness to cooperate should increase the impor-
tance of coalition considerations in a voter’s decision-making
process. Whether a positive coalition signal conditions the post-
electoral expectations or, as we would argue, increases the
importance of consideration about a speciﬁc coalition, both
mechanisms yield the same observable implication: Coalition
vignettes should positively increase the impact of the respec-
tive coalition considerations in a voter’s decision-making pro-
cess. Future research should try to design a study that is able
to disentangle the priming from the expectation-formation
account.
While we have identiﬁed a plausible mechanism how coa-
lition signals can work and inﬂuence an individual’s decision-
making process, we do not have direct evidence of the pre-
cise cognitive processes that are triggered when citizens are
primed to think about coalitions. For example, this process
could be highly affective or purely policy-driven. Do citizens
who are primed with coalition signals think about the ex-
pected policy position of the potential coalition governments
and ﬁnally decide if it is still worth voting for one of the par-
ties in that signal, or do they rather rely on likability con-
siderations? The survey data we have is not ideally suited to
disentangle the cognitive processes that underlie electoral
decision making. Nevertheless, our results highlight that the
electoral competition between parties can organize the psy-
chological processes voters employ to make their decisions.
Following this line of thought, we might expect that coalition
signals that also mention concrete programmatic platforms
or policies will initiate a policy-driven reaction instead of an
affective one.
To further put our conclusions in context, we need to
point out that all coalition signals used here were reason-
able but clearly hypothetical, making any prediction of real
world impact highly tentative. It is more or less impossible to
manipulate the actual coalition signals of real parties, espe-
cially within a nationally representative survey. Our goal was
to test theoretical expectations about the causal mechanism
outside the lab rather then estimating their real-world con-
sequences in an actual campaign. Further research on the
nature and role of coalition signals needs to pay more at-
tention to the heterogeneity of such effects caused by posi-
tive and negative coalition signals or by different sources of
such signals.
Volume 79 Number 2 April 2017 / 653
This content downloaded from 130.060.130.056 on December 12, 2017 03:23:28 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Our study has very clear theoretical and practical impli-
cations. Theoretically, coalition signals require more atten-
tion. There seems to be a consensus among the few studies
that explored the effects of coalition signals that voters ap-
pear to take them systematically into account when mak-
ing a decision. Theories of voting behavior must account
for such preelectoral party strategies as contextual features.
In order to understand the electoral impact of such strate-
gies, scholars need to understand when and why parties
send out which type of coalition signal. Our study therefore
contributes to an emerging literature that sees behavioral
and institutional explanations of party competition as al-
lies rather than rivals (see, e.g., Sniderman and Levendusky
2007).
There are also rather practical implications for our un-
derstanding of party competition. Our results suggest that
coalition signals can have real electoral costs and beneﬁts
for parties. They require careful thought about the conse-
quences, whether a signal will beneﬁt or hurt a party, or even
affect a third party not included in the signal. Parties want
to make sure that they have a net beneﬁt from the gains
and losses when sending out speciﬁc signals. Thus, our theory
allows to identify conditions under which parties should have
a strong incentive to send out coalition signals during elec-
tion campaigns. For instance, if a coalition is more popular
than the party itself, or if the coalition position is closer to the
median voter, rational parties should send a respective coa-
lition signal. Future research can build on this ﬁnding to better
understand the conditions under which parties are especially
likely to form preelectoral coalitions.
Finally, our strategy to estimate the relative importance of
competing mechanisms across different contexts can be ap-
plied not just to parties and coalitions but to other decision-
relevant considerations as well. The literature on informa-
tion environments (Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen 2006; Kuklinski
et al. 2001) could use designs similar to our coalition vignettes
to show under what conditions certain information environ-
ments affect the quality of decisions. A similar model to ours
could be employed in the areas of political behavior and po-
litical psychology to test the importance of primed informa-
tion, for instance for certain policies, and their behavioral
consequences. Even a comparative approach is possible, for
example, by studying the behavioral responses in different
contexts by comparing the importance of the EU-integration
dimension for vote choice in EU and national elections. We
have shown that coalition signals create a new context that
inﬂuences decision making by emphasizing different decision
criteria. Thus, similar designs to the one used here should help
scholars to test observable implications of contrasting mech-
anisms that drive political decisions in different contexts.
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